“If the American people ever allow private banks to control the issuance of their currency, first by inflation and then by deflation, the banks and corporations that will grow up around them will deprive the people of all their property until their children will wake up homeless on the continent their fathers conquered.”

 Thomas Jefferson (1743-1826), 3rd US President

“It is well enough that people do not understand our banking and monetary system, for if they did, I believe there would be a revolution before tomorrow morning.” 

Henry Ford (1863-1947), American automobile industrialist

“When plunder becomes a way of life for a group of men living together in society, they create for themselves, in the course of time, a legal system that authorizes it and a moral code that glorifies it.

”Frederic Bastiat (1801-1850), French economist

It is becoming increasingly obvious that the Bernanke Fed’s monetary policy of fixing short-term interest rates at close to zero percent, and (with inflation at two percent or so) of forcing negative real interest rates, was primarily designed not to help the U.S. economy but to shore up the super large American banks that were on the verge of bankruptcy when the investment bank Lehman Brothers failed on September 15, 2008. Indeed, with this policy, the Bernanke Fed has transferred hundreds of billions to these super banks at a huge cost to the rest of the economy and to international holders of U.S. dollars.

Just as the Greenspan Fed created the housing bubble and let the derivatives market explode, thus sowing the seeds of the 2007-2008 financial crisis, the Bernanke Fed, using faulty economic analysis, has embarked upon a policy of zero short-term interest rates for many years, —an open-ended QE3 policy of buying mortgages and other financial instruments with newly printed money, thus creating the largest bond bubble in U.S. history.

When the distortions it has created in the U.S. economy unfolds in the coming years, the true costs of this policy will become clearer. Indeed, when the Fed tries to unload the financial assets it has acquired from the near-insolvent super large American banks, in a not too distant future, bond prices will be in danger of collapsing and nominal interest rates could spike, with a very negative impact on financial markets and on the real economy.

Economists know that price controls and price fixing do not work, at least, not for very long. Credit markets are not immune to this economic reality. In any market, for any good or service, when prices are fixed by a government or a government agency below the market clearing price, sooner or later a gap develops between the excess quantity demanded and the insufficient quantity offered.

The classical example of resource misallocation is rent control implemented in some cities and in some countries. The inevitable result of such a policy is eventually the appearance of a shortage of rental units and a deterioration in the quality of those still offered. In fact, if any given government wishes to create housing slums and a housing shortage, it can just impose stringent rent controls on a permanent basis. This does not mean that housing cannot be subsidized. But freezing prices is generally not an efficient way to subsidize housing or any other commodity or service.

Now. What happens when the Fed artificially sets the short-term interest rate at close to zero for a long period? A long series of negative economic repercussions follow.

-First, large banks which have access to Fed loans at this artificially low rate will borrow as much of that newly created money as they can and they will lend risk-free to the deficit-laden government at two or three percent. Nice trade if you can get it!

-Second, the demand for bank loans will go up with the banks’ prime borrowing rate artificially low. However, banks will increase their borrowing requirements for private borrowers since they can invest their excess reserves risk-free, either at the Fed itself, albeit a low rate, or by lending to the government at a higher rate. Private borrowers will be frustrated and valuable projects may remain under-financed, while the government has little incentive to curb its deficit.

-Third, banks and their preferential clients will use part of their excess reserves obtained at close to zero percent to buy financial assets. Stock prices and bond prices will go up.

-Fourth, other investors such as insurance companies and pension funds, with the knowledge that the Fed will keep short-term rates low for an extended period of time, will buy staggered long-term bonds and keep their prices artificially high, when one considers the inflation risk and the time risk involved.

-Fifth, with borrowing rates so low for so long, some financial operators will begin buying up companies with leveraged money, thus placing finance ahead of industry.

—All of this translates into negative economic and financial distorsions in the long run.

Maybe that’s the reason the Bernanke Fed seems so popular on Wall Street. It has been a powerful tool for asset reflation. I even personally heard a financial commentator on the CNBC financial TV network declare that Ben Bernanke was the “best Fed chairman, ever” because he was being credited for a stock market rally!

Such is not the consensus among economists and on Main Street, where savers and retirees on fixed income have seen their revenues collapse over the last five years. That reminds me how Fed chairman Alan Greenspan was venerated on Wall Street, that is, until it became clear that his policy of low interest rates, easy money, junk mortgages and inadequate banking regulation brought down the financial house of cards. In economics, there is no magic, and the piper has to be paid sooner or later!

I don’t know if it is because of the fact that the American central bank and its federal banking system is partly owned by large private banks, or because there are so many bankers who sit on the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC), (the committe that sets interest rates) and who are in conflict of interest, but the Fed has a recurring and nagging tendency to create financial bubbles and economic booms and busts that end up—more often than not—benefiting large banks and their CEOs, at a huge cost to the real economy. The Fed is really an institution primarily designed to subsidize large banks with public money.

The American government itself subsidized the large banks with its $700 billion TARP program. We agree that the Fed had to intervene during the financial panic that followed the failure of Lehman Brothers, whatever its role in creating that crisis. However, did it have an obligation to keep subsidizing the super large banks for five years or more and dump the cost on the rest of the economy while imposing very little restraint on their lax behavior? I don’t think so.

The Fed cannot argue that without such a prolonged subsidy policy, the ­economic recovery after the 2008-2009 recession would have been thwarted. In fact, this has been the slowest recovery from a recession since WWII. And the Bernanke Fed should share some responsibility for that.

But now that the Bernanke Fed has dug itself into a monetary hole, it should be extra prudent and careful in reversing course, less it precipitate the U.S. economy into another recession.

People have suffered enough in losing their jobs and, for many, their homes, and for many retirees, the income from their savings, without again being the Fed’s victims.

Dr. Rodrigue Tremblay, a Canadian-born economist, is the author of the book “The Code for Global Ethics, Ten Humanist Principles”, and of “The New American Empire”)

SOURCE GLOBALRESEARCH.CA

A)Beware Of The Fake Gold Floating Around


SOURCE   http://seekingalpha.com/


B)THE GOLD STANDARD: CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES

INTRODUCTION
The term "gold standard" signifies a paper money economy in which the
government is contractually bound to convert a unit of its circulating paper
money into an inter temporally constant amount of a real commodity, usually
a precious metal because of the relative transactional convenience of such
conversion payments. Whether or not a country is on a gold standard has
substantial effects on the welfare of its people.
The gold standard first appeared in China during an early-ninth-century
renaissance in ancient Chinese religion and effective democracy and was
consistently maintained there in some form throughout China's lengthy golden
age of technological and economic expansion until the standard, and the
extended renaissance, was finally brought to an end in 1620 with the maturation
of China's unfortunately durable reversion to philosopher  authoritarianism.
Although the idea of the gold Standard was introduced to the West at the end
of the thirteenth century by Marco Polo  who was greatly impressed by the
convertible certificates of the initially silver-rich Mongol Emperors, not until
four centuries later did the gold standard begin an independent life-cycle of its
own in the West.

1. The Rise and Fall of the Gold Standard in the West
Economic folklore attributes the evolution of the gold standard in the  West to the development of a fractional gold­reserve system by seventeenth  century English goldsmiths who lent out a fraction of their idle gold reserves  in exchange for promissory notes that they used to back private
issues of negotiable paper debt, i.e., paper money. But similar private banking
institutions had already developed much earlier without special comment in
medieval Florence and Venice.
The true innovators were the governmental leaders of England's new  democracy following her "Glorious Revolution" of 1688. This path breaking   democratic revolution, while providing a legal and philosophical ("rights-of  man") commitment to compensate the citizen-Soldiers of  the huge new armies   of rifle-equipped Englishmen for their large wartime personal sacrifices, did  nothing to prevent the new democracy from subsequently repealing its debts to  those who had made large wartime financial sacrifices. Yet such Financial   sacrifices had been necessary for the survival of the fledgling democracy  because, as we shall see, military leaders cannot defend a democracy unless
they can override the self-defeating , but narrowly rational -- appeasement response to potential aggressors that characterizes any democratic legislature.
The governmental invention of the gold standard, by solving this critical  problem in defense  finance for the newly forming democratic nations of the West, cleared the path to modernity.
The evolution of the gold standard in the West was thus begun by the  newly established Bank of England during the formative years of what was to  become our first successful national democracy. Then, almost a century  later. after a failed Swedish experiment to establish a national democracy
supported by a cumbersome copper­ standard (1719-1772), a second viable  precíous­ metal standard was adopted in   by the newly formed Bank of the  United States in what was to become our second successful national   democracy.
Then, due largely to the remarkable success of these two nations relative to their neighbors, the standard -- usually accompanied by substantial   democratization -- spread to Continental Europe, Latin America and Japan  during the nineteenth century. The restructured countries similarly enjoyed eras  of remarkably successful national defense and exceptionally high, albeit fitful,overall economic growth. Eventually, in the early-mid 1930s, based largely  upon the cumulative impact of  the "Cambridge School" of  economics led by the  increasingly influential  John Maynard Keynes, each European nation separately  abandoned its gold standard in order to give its central bank greater flexibility   in fighting the unemployment characterizing the Great Depression.

Only the U.S. remained on a gold standard, albeit one with harsh curbs imposed on the export and possession of gold. And only the U.S. could finance  the military defense of the democracies during WWII.
After the end of WWII, an international "gold exchange standard" was  set up. This was achieved by executing a 1944 agreement developed in an  international monetary conference at Breton Woods, New Hampshire, in which  financial representatives of  the democratic nations of Europe all agreed to
work to make their countries' paper currencies convertible into the U.S. dollar  as long as the U.S. maintained a  conversion rate of the dollar into gold in  exchanges with foreign central banks. This internationally cooperative kind of   gold standard effectively served the emergency military requirements of the   recovering European democracies, and in the same  recession- producing way that the internationally individualistic gold  standard had served prior to the early 1930s. Then, upon the completion of a   U .S.­ centered nuclear defense system for the democratic nations of  the West
during the late 1960-5, this last remnant of  the gold standard was quickly phased  out and finally eliminated when the U.S. closed the gold window on 15 August,197l .
Since that date, no government has made a viable claim of convertibility  of its paper money into a real asset of any kind.

2. Business Cycles and the Gold Standard
Because, during periods of free commercialise of paper money into  a real asset, the public is free to exchange idle real commodity stocks for   paper money, or vice verse, the total demand for this convertible paper  completely determines its supply. Governmental monetary authorities then
have no direct control over the money supply. The correspondingly passive  money supply has been generally understood by political economists to be  a property of a classical gold standard since the writings of Adam Smith, as reflected in the policy­  oriented writings of Thomas Tooke and the
English "Banking School" in the 1840s, of J. Laurence Laughlin and the  U.S. "sound money school“ of  the 1890s, and of  the early supporters of the Federal Reserve Act of 1913. All of these authors saw great benefits in the  system's ability to automatically expand and contract its peace time paper
money supply in response to "the needs of trade" without affecting prices  to any significant degree.
Such benefits are absent during periods of suspended or non-existent convertibility. During such periods, independent governments, such as the  contemporary U.S. government, are free to tix their paper money supplies  "exogenously", i.e., without regard to legal commitments. Thus` with
observed governmental monetary authorities unwilling to Surrender their discretionary control to an automatic mechanism, sudden expansions or   contractions in the demand for ìnconvertible paper money have regularly raised or depressed commodity prices and correspondingly generated
avoidable business cycles. This has been well-recognized since the early  days of classical economics, as reflected in Henry Thortons famous  analysis of  the effects of a monetary shock on prices and interest rates  during periods of suspended gold payments. The analysis was placed in
a somewhat more explicit, mini ­general­  equilibrium-type, setting for  permanently in convertible,  money economics in the late 1930s  by Keynes and John R. Hicks and survives today as what is commonly  called "neo-Keynesian macroeconomics".

Examples of such business cycles, and correspondingly of the social value of a passive money supply, are easily supplied. At the time  of this writing,  the last two U.S. recessions provide almost
identical examples of how sudden fluctuations in the demand for a fiat money create
modem business cycles that would have been automatically avoided if we  had adopted a suitable gold standard. The suddenly higher demands for  U.S. paper money, the medium for the payment of U.S. taxes, 'Following  both the mid-1982 and mid-1990 Presidential announcements of near-
future tax-rate increases immediately precipitated almost identical  economic declines rather than immediate increases in the stock of paper  money. In contrast, these recessions would have been automatically  avoided if our paper money supply ,had been freely convertible (into a real asset whose relative price were unaffected by the tax-rate) and therefore automatically expanded part
pasu with the tax needs of trade.
However, a gold-standard produces its own unique brand of  business cycle. In particular, gold-standard depressions occur when, and  only when, there are shocks that increase the equilibrium value of the conversion commodity relative to other commodities, thereby decreasing
the general price level by the Same percentage. A correspondingly severe  gold-standard depression induces a percentage reduction in the endogenous money supply approximately equal to the percentage  reduction in the price of ordinary goods relative to the fixed-price  conversion commodity. In sharp contrast, the same relative demand  shock would occasion no systematic change in the overall price level or  aggregate output if there were an exogenous  currency stock. The
gold ­standard government's inability to so  fix  the paper money supply, and thereby avoid the severe depressions caused by shocks that  significantly increase the relative demand for the conversion commodity,is by far the main disadvantage of a gold standard.
Moreover  such business cycles, including the Great Depression occurred regularly under the gold standard  And  despite the relative ease with which they could be -- and actually were -- predicted by financial  experts, the cycles in real output under the gold standard were of much  greater amplitude and duration than those observed under our recent, in convertible, governmental managed, monetary systems. Viewed solely from the standpoint of the economic costs of  the business cycle, the gold
standard was, therefore, probably, on net, socially disadvantageous.

3. Emergency Finance and the Gold Standard
However, as already noted, by far the main advantage of a gold standard to an adopting country was its historically unique ability to facilitate the financing of large-scale military emergencies. The underlying reason for this ability is that a wartime suspension of a governmental conversion promise is widely regarded as a temporary force majeure, an excusable but temporary supply interruption in an otherwise inviolable contract between a powerful government and an innocent individual citizen,
the latter being conceived of as requiring the substantial protection of the  law. Post-emergency law courts and legislatures therefore typically  enforced depression-producing resumptions of pre-war gold conversion  payments on their paper monies, although usually only after several years
of extended legislative debate during which time suitable revenue-increasing measures could be devised in order to finance the retirement of  the large issues of wartime paper.
Before the nuclear age, when emergency national defense was a  prolonged and expensive affair, this financial advantage had been necessary  for the military survival of national democracies. Theoretically, this  financial sine qua non of pre-nuclear modern democracy arises because
there is a time-inconsistent, overly appeasing, response of any narrowly  rational collection of voters to each in a series of broadly rational threats of  all­  out-war by external aggressors demanding individually small favors. A democratic nation whose leaders are unable to overcome this legislative
appeasement   problem by independently Financing its military defense would, sooner or
later, be subjugated by external aggressors.
More specifically, the late seventeenth century founders of  the Bank  of England were acutely aware both of the historical reluctance of  independent parliaments to supply funds necessary for emergency military  defense and of the recent military failure of neighboring Holland's  pioneering, but short-lived, national democracy. These perceptive British  bankers, along with their new Dutch King, William iii, saw that Holland's  failure was due to the disastrous legal inability of  the Bank of Amsterdam  to expand her innovative paper money supply in a defensive emergency (the  War of 1672). This unfortunate infeasibility was due to a rule in the banks  constitution limiting its issue of paper money to its effective gold reserve.
In any case, the war-troubled William III, his pragmatic English  bankers and a Scottish banking promoter, William Paterson, worked to  create a national paper currency that would flexibly expand during military  emergencies, and do so without creating proportionate increases in the price
level. Under a gold standard, extra paper money could be created and spent  during the defensive emergencies, although convertibility would have to be  temporarily suspended to prevent a  of  the paper money back to the Bank. (The first formal suspension of gold payments thus occurred in
1695, barely one year after the money was first issued; and the suspension lasted only the two additional years that William required to impressively defeat the formidable France of Louis IVX.) The suspension-induced  expansion of the paper money supply would in turn cause some wartime
inflation. But since the new paper money represented a durable contract  between the individual money-holder and the government meant that  English  judges would likely attempt to enforce an eventual resumption of  gold payments at the original conversion rate as a matter of common law.
Parliament , unwilling to risk yet another constitutional crisis and civil war predictably ordered the resumption of gold payments at the old conversion rate -- and continued to do so until 1931  despite the need for both a real post-war tax increase the finance the payments and a depressionary return to
the pre-War price trend  was the very expectation of this post-war  depression by the financial comm unity that allowed the wartime expansion in governmental purchasing, power that was in tum required for the survival of the democracy.
Then, early in the eighteenth century, after a couple of such wars  widespread parliamentary support arose for large wartime issues of long-term national debt. For such borrowing served as a convenient substitute  for wartime monetary  expansion. Although moderate interest would be due
on such borrowing, repayment could be delayed to dates that would  officially distribute the inter  generational burden of the war in a more  politically acceptable fashion or moderate the social costs of the anticipated  post-war deflation. War finance in countries with mature gold standards
was therefore typically marked by substantial issues of legislatively  approved, long-term, governmental debt as well as by Suspension-induced  monetary expansions. The resulting appearance of a simple willingness on  the part of  the democratic legislatures of gold standard nations to support
defensive warfare with substantial domestic issues of long-term debt has   obscured, for
even the most astute of contemporary economic observers, the basic  problem that the gold standard was solving.
In any case  without the gold standard, emergency finance would  have doubtless remained in the hands of clubs of wealthy noblemen,bankers, and guild aristocrats, groups,,whose peacetime compensation for  their extensive wartime sacrifices depended on maintaining highly elitist
religions and philosophies, anti­modern (although currently re emergent) value systems deserving their countries by exaggerating the personal  wisdom and benevolence of appropriately educated aristocrats.
Indeed, before the nuclear age, no independent nation evolved  aristocracy to a surviving national democracy without the aid of a gold  Standard.

4. Mainstream Macroeconomics and the Gold Standard
This major advantage of a gold standard, although never a  recognized part of mainstream economics, has been particularly obscured  to modern economists by an error in basic Keynesian economics leading to  the theoretical conclusion that a permanent increase in a fiat money supply
lowers interest rates. This theoretical error, the source of a major  unresolved empirical paradox in Keynesian theory called the Gibson  paradox   led Keynes and subsequent generations of economists, to a  dangerously false belief. This was the misbelief that emergency expansions
in a  money supply  which were correctly understood to be permanent  increases in the money supply  would be partially hoarded. Such induced  hoarding would occur because of  the theoretically induced decreases in the  foregone-interest cost of holding money. The increases in commodity
prices during  emergencies would then be proportionately less than the  corresponding money-supply increases. If this is true, then the permanent money-supply increases occurring during a wartime emergency in a flat money economy would produce unambiguous increases in  emergency  governmental purchasing power, just as had occurred for the  temporary monetary expansions that had been induced by national emergencies under the classical gold standard. A correction of this
theoretical error leads to the opposite theoretical prediction. A permanent  increase in a flat money supply in a capital-theoretically correct macro-model, by unambiguously increasing the marginal productivity of capital and leaving the rationally expected inflation rate constant, leads to an  increase in interest rates and therefore an increase in the opportunity cost  of holding money- Dis hoarding, not hoarding, is induced. Such a monetary  expansion thus results in percentage increases in prices that  the  percentage increases in money supplies.

Besides freeing us from the Gibson paradox, this theoretical  correction leads us to understand why democratic Europe was so uncharacteristically weak in its response to Fascist aggression in the late
1930s. It also enables us to understand why the U.S., the only country that  did not abandon the gold standard, at least in international transactions, was  able to generate uniquely large increases in emergency governmental  purchasing power and, as part of the same process, maintain exceptionally
low interest rates throughout WWII.
Democratic Europe's intellectually  fashionable abandonment of the gold standard in the early 1930s in order  to forestall further depression therefore appears to have been a serious policy error. The fashionable abandonment left democratic Europe wide-open to the threat of all-out attack by rationally selected military fanatics, who then naturally emerged in the mid­late 1930s. The only democratic  nation that was sufficiently resistant to intellectual fashion to remain on the
gold standard, the U.S., was therefore the only nation able to finance a wartime defense effort adequate to the task of "defending the world for  democracy".
Although it may appear peculiar, the mainstream literature on the gold standard has traditionally avoided the important political-economic issues discussed above in favor of narrower and more speculative discussions dealing with the dynamics of international price adjustment.

The latter include: (I) David  seminal discussion of the laissez  faire gold-flows, and corresponding price-level changes, occurring between nations in a suddenly disequillibrated hypothetical world whose only money  consists of full-bodied gold coins; (2) the famous "currency school" versus
"banking school" debate leading to Peel's Bank Charter Act of l 844, which  enshrined Hume's view of the natural adjustment process, except that the Central Bank could respond to a shock inducing continual gold drains by  Bank borrowing (ie. by raising the Banks discount rate) serving to raise
the domestic relative price of gold and thereby hasten the final laissez faire  price adjustment while at the same time preventing a costly overshooting  of gold flows during the adjustment period; and (3) the increasingly  acrimonious post-WWI discussions of the negative short-term employment
effects on other nations of the above,  borrowing  policies (or restrictive short­term trade policies) and the corresponding  international disapproval of gold-hoarding (perennially by France and, in
the critical I929-32 period1 by the United States) to the point that such   borrowing policies were condemned as "not playing according to the rules" of an imaginary international game. The international sensitivity of these dynamical effects is probably what best accounts for the fact that the most  influential authors in the field have traditionally been specialists in  intellectual diplomacy and strategically sophisticated communication.

5. The Broad Price Trends Observed Under the Gold Standard
To describe the basic workings of the gold standard with added  precision, it is help full to assume a zero "transaction­  costs"perfectly   competitive, equilibrium in all markets. Then, multiplying the
governments fixed, inter temporally constant, money price of gold by the  perfectly competitive equilibrium price of any other commodity relative to gold, we can immediately determine the my price of that commodity.
Since this can be done for all commodities, and without reference to the  passively determined money supply, equilibrium relative prices in a perfectly competitive money economy can be determined independently of  the monetary sector. The resulting "classical dichotomy" between the real
and monetary sectors of an economy., which was implicit in most of classical and early neoclassical economics, greatly facilitates the  quantitative analysis of the economy.
In a perfectly competitive economy with a gold standard, idle Stocks  of gold (called "monetary gold" when they are held by financial  institutions), like any other currently non-productive asset„ must be
expected to appreciate at a rate equal to the real rate of  return to holding  currently productive assets. Thus, issuers of gold-convertible paper money  need not pay direct interest on their monies. Indeed, Convertible banknotes  bore no direct interest while money prices in gold-standard economies
generally fell slightly during` peacetime, reflecting the slightly positive real  interest rate on alternative investment goods.
During wartime, when gold standard economies generated large  increases in the money supply and suspensions of gold payments, there were typically substantial releases of monetary gold to the public, roughly  constant money prices of gold, and therefore increases in the nominal prices
of most other goods. Nevertheless, the rational expectation of postwar resumptions of gold conversion payments, and corresponding postwar  reductions in commodity prices implied higher-than-normal rates of return  to holding paper money relative to goods during the wartime emergencies.
Increases in the governments  wartime purchasing power therefore accompanied wartime increases in the governments nominal issue of paper  money. This powerful financial weapon provided a gold­standard  government with a potential wartime increase in zero-interest purchasing power limited only by the government's ability to repay the zero-interest  loan after the war by suitably raising postwar taxes to finance future  conversion payments. The increase in the rationally expected deflation rate  also generated, after the Brie` learning period of 1695-1725, nominal
interest rates that typically remained low (below 5%) during major Wars throughout the gold-standard era despite the obvious wartime increases in both real interest rates and default risks.

But this main advantage of  the gold standard also implied postwar depressions as monetary gold was gradually re accumulated by the central banks which correspondingly increased the value of gold relative to other  commodities. Repetitive innovations economizing on gold conversion
during these resumption periods  first by including silver as a conversion  metal, then by limiting conversion to bullion, then by allowing conversion  into another country‘s convertible currency, then by outlawing the private   hoarding of gold, and finally by restricting gold payments to conversion payments made by a single country to foreign central banks , beneficially  served to mitigate these consistently depressionary resumption costs and create a long-term trend of money prices in the West that was roughly constant throughout the entire quarter-millennial era of its classical gold standard, 1694-1944.
The demise of the international gold exchange standard in the quarter-century following WWII followed closely behind the development of an international system of nuclear defense, because, as already noted, a well—equipped nuclear power does not require large increases in cumulative  expenditures during a defense emergency. As the underlying advantage of the gold-standard was thus becoming increasingly obsolete, the number of real experiences of the emergency financial benefits provided by the gold standard correspondingly diminished. And as the main disadvantage in the form of potential cyclical instability obviously remained  most imminently in the form of a potential worldwide recession if the US,were to attempt a resumption of gold payments that had been suspended since 1968 -- the international political support for a gold standard by practical people rapidly eroded.

6. Emergency Finance After the Gold Standard
Nevertheless, smaller, non-nuclear armed, nations, while likely to be living under a larger nation's "nuclear umbrella", still have been facing substantial emergency financial demands to cover domestic political uprisings. Such countries, even after the abandonment of the BrettonWoods agreement, have typically attempted, quite rationally, to unilaterally keep their currencies convertible into the fiat currency of a large foreign country in order to maintain the financial advantages of a gold standard.However, the repetitive hyperinflation of the 1970s proved that the legal systems of these nations did not treat a domestic government promise to convert a unit of its currency into a fixed amount of an in convertible paper currency of a foreign nation anything like a promise to convert into gold.
The 1980-5 and early 1990s have thus been a period in which these  countries have enlisted the aid of foreign governments, usually through international economic organizations set up at Bretton Woods and  somehow surviving the collapse of the original agreement. to commit themselves to a more durably fixed exchange rate. These recent attempts,although much more successful in controlling the secular inflation rates of small countries, and correspondingly in achieving domestic political stability, have also produced a series of small-country, post-emergency depressions quite analogous to the large-country depressions occurring under the gold standard. Finally, looking to the future, the problem of emergency finance in large Democratic nations has not permanently disappeared. For one thing,the continuing growth of governmental indebtedness beginning about 35 years ago is steadily diminishing the abilities of governmental authorities to finance future emergencies, including domestic emergencies, with ordinary borrowing. There is therefore an increasing need for large democracies to provide mechanisms that will finance future emergencies.But prospective democratic legislatures cannot be expected to adopt  mechanisms that will burden their future economies with post-emergency depressions anything like those observed under the classical gold standard. It follows that if new, depression-resistant, mechanisms of emergency finance are not adopted, and pre- l8th century history and recent trends are any guide, the increasing emergency usefulness of wealthy individuals  relative to ordinary civilians will inevitably lead to a tortuous degeneration  of our effective democracies back into elitist aristocracies such as those that had dominated our governments prior to the rise of the gold standard.

By Earl A- Thonipsori

SOURCE    http://www.econ.ucla.edu

(BEING CONTINUED FROM  26/02/12)




3.2 The Paradigm

There are two aspects to the Swiss paradigm; first, forces inside the Swiss domestic policy arena caused its formation. Secondly, the paradigm functioned as Europe’s prime example of successful economic management, during the 19<sup>th century. Both aspects undermine the Hobson’s Anglo-centric viewpoints on laissez-faire.127 Let us deal first with the paradigm as an instrument of Swiss state building.




Secondly, this successful economic compromise of Switzerland produced widespread admiration throughout 19th century-Europe – while images of prosperous China were still being diffused .The commercial wu-wei had resulted from the fact that Switzerland’s prosperity (i.e. the welfare of Swiss minben) had depended on the free flow of European commerce, for centuries.131 Haller’s general wu-wei</sup> 

laissez-faire commercial tradition. As one of Europe’s key economic gateways, a majority of the cantons’s economies had conditioned themselves to function in a continuous environment of free trade (like Bale), although pockets of protectionism continued to exist (like Bern), right up to the 19^{th century.132 The influential English free trader Richard Cobden was one of the first admirers of Switzerland’s strange blend of agricultural and industrial prosperity, of agrarian and commercial wu-wei. On the 6th June 1834, he wrote to his brother, from Geneva:}

"The people of this country [Switzerland], are I believe the best governed and therefore the most prosperous and happy in the world. It is the only Government [,] which has not, one     

douanière in its pay, and yet, thanks to free trade, there is scarcely any branch of manufacturing industry which does not in one part or other of the country find a healthy occupation. The farmers are substantial. Here is a far more elevated character of husbandry life than I expected to see. Enormous farm-houses and barns; plenty of out-houses of every kind; and the horses and cows are superior to those of the English farmers."133

Like the prominent German political economist Friedrich List, Cobden was amazed that the free-trading Swiss economy, unlike his native England, included substantial farming.134 Nonetheless, he was just as impressed by the Swiss partly urban manufacturing industry i.e. Haller’s commercial wu-wei. This type of admiration of the Swiss economy was typical for the 19th century-disciples of the Libaniusian model. In consequence, the paradigm of the Swiss wu-wei state helped to  

transform Europe into an altered image of the

wu-wei Empire. At last, Confucius and Libanius would fuse into one great modern Eurasian theory of political economy and the European diffusion of wu-wei had been completed.

Conclusion  

To conclude, we will draw attention to the three major findings of this paper. Firstly, the analysis demonstrated that the Chinese principle of

wu-wei was actually imported and primarily diffused by the commercial and Jesuit nexus of the Low Countries. Consequently, the details of China’s expertise entered Europe via the textual diffusion of the Jesuit texts and were visually supported by million of minben-images during the ceramic boom. Secondly, it has been shown that the intellectual foundation of the School of Physiocracy is a direct replica of the imported Chinese economic craftsmanship of agrarian wu-wei; consequently the European Libaniusian ideology cannot to be considered the intellectual master-model of Physiocracy. Thirdly, it has been made clear that Switzerland was the first European paradigm state of wu-wei. The European crystallization process of wu-wei ultimately ended with the Swiss state of 1848, in which Chinese agrarian wu-wei was institutionally fused with traditional Swiss commercial wu-wei. In due course, this alpine paradigm enabled the Libaniusian model to verify and reflect upon its own theory of a commercial society. In the following, we will touch on the broader implications of these three findings.

The fact that the Chinese principle of wu-wei was imported into Europe via the Low Countries proves clearly that research, which stresses the purely indigenous development of Europe’s laissez-faire doctrine, is mistaken. McCormick and others do focus too much on the non-Eurasian development of the European revival of the Libaniusian model and leave out the parallel emergence of the Chinese model. Only    

by re-focusing on the historical forces, which allowed both models to exist and mature simultaneously, can historians win a deeper understanding of the origins of  

laissez-faire in Europe. The Low Countries are a supreme example of the historical proximity of both models, and a great deal may be learned from a direct and more detailed juxtaposition of Grotius and the early characteristics of wu-wei’s importation; on this matter, I have only touched the historical surface. Furthermore, the Low Countries offered essentially two entry points for wu-wei’s diffusion into Europe: firstly, their printing presses and secondly, the import of ceramics.

The groundbreaking textual base was truly enhanced by the visual wave of images that confirmed a China at the peak of her economic development. The sinophile triangle of Amsterdam, Antwerp and Douai, was perfectly suited to push the message of       

wu-wei into the wider European arena of diffusion. Yet it was also an environment that was perfectly conditioned to receive wu-wei in the first place. In sum, wu-wei in the Low Countries was the outcome of a Catholic-Protestant, Flemish-Dutch co-production. Without the Jesuit from Douai the printing presses of Amsterdam would have remained quiet – so much for Max Weber.

The second part’s re-affirmation of Physiocracy as a direct copy of Chinese expertise is not as novel to current research, as it may sound – Hudson and Clarke are only the two recent examples of this approach. Yet, the assertion of Quesnay as the ‘Confucius of Europe’ remains controversial, until this very day. Repeatedly, textbooks on the history of economic thought have continued to re-instate Physiocracy’s debt to Europe’s indigenous Libaniusian model. In this Eurocentric model, the direct links between the ancient Stoics, Newton and Quesnay remain untouched by incoming Eurasian influences. Part two of this paper has tried to demonstrate that this linear model of European thought is erroneous. The relative qualities of Europe can only be located in her capacity to embrace, fuse and transform non-European information; it is incorrect to construct her history of economic thought around a nexus of  

mental autarchy and the example of the history of      

wu-wei in France verifies this claim. Quesnay has to be understood as a mind inside the Eurasian web of economic thought, his ordre naturel as a product of wu-weian influence and his so-called Physiocracy as a copy of China’s nongben-minben paradigm. It is only through this Eurasian assertion that one can appreciate the implications of Physiocracy’s Swiss connections.

Finally, Switzerland’s economic model of 1848 is not completely a one-to-one model of the wu-wei Empire, and of course, her commercial wu-wei is as much a product of the Libaniusian model as much it is reinforced by the European diffusion of wu-wei. Nevertheless, the first state inside Europe, which is actually deeply shaped by wu-wei, remains Switzerland – neither the British Empire of Adam Smith, nor François Quesnay’s France. Albrecht von Haller’s Swiss vision of Usong can be considered the first work of a European mind, which dis-connected the original agrarian wu-wei doctrine of China from its agrocentric i.e. nongben base, and added something truly European, namely commercial wu-wei. This process of fusion led to the European paradigm of wu-wei, namely 19^{th century Switzerland – admired and renowned by the disciples of the Libaniusian model, Cobden and List. The ‘new Eidgenossenschaft’ of 1848, based on free trade, commerce and a peasant state ideology can therefore be seen as the ultimate apex of wu-wei in Europe. Thus, two hundred years after the end of the terror of the Thirty-Years-War, a mountainous part of western Eurasia had created a new vision of harmonious government for the welfare of its people – we now know that without the diffusion of wu-wei, this might never have happened.}           

THE END

Christian Gerlach

Department of Economic History
London School of Economics

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Christian_Gerlach




NOTES


127.Hobson, Eastern Origins, chapter 11.

128

Manfred Hettling, Geschichtlichkeit – Zwerge auf den Schultern von Riesen, pp. 91- 92 in: Jakob Tanner et al, Eine kleine Geschichte der Schweiz. Der Bundesstaat und seine Traditionen (Frankfurt 1998), pp. 94- 95, 100- 105.

129

Walther Rupli, Zollreform und Bundesreform in der Schweiz 1815- 1848 (Zürich 1949), p. 188.

130

Matthias Weishaupt, Bauern, Hirten und «frume edle puren». Bauern und Bauernstaatsideologie in der spätmittelalterlichen Eidgenossenschaft und der nationalen Geschichtsschreibung der Schweiz (Basel/ Frankfurt 1992), pp. 86-95.

¹³¹ Eduard Fueter, Die Schweiz seit 1848 (Zürich/ Leipzig 1928), p. 150.
132